Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are (...) not reliable measures of metaethical belief. We end by discussing the implications of our account for the philosophical and practical implications of research on the psychology of metaethics. (shrink)

This article introduces evolutionary psychology to a general readership, with the purpose of applying evolutionary psychology to suicide terrorism. Some of the key concepts related to evolutionary psychology are discussed, as well as several misconceptions associated with this approach to psychology. We argue that one of the primary, but insufficient, motivating factors for suicide terrorism is strong religious belief. Evolutionary psychological theories related to religious belief, and supporting empirical work, are described, laying a foundation for examining suicide terrorism. Several promising (...) directions for future research on suicide terrorism from an evolutionary psychological perspective are highlighted, particularly within the theoretical framework of kin selection, and the implications of applying evolutionary psychology to suicide terrorism are discussed. (shrink)

Machery & Mallon [The moral psychology handbook (pp. 3–47). New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010] argue that existing evidence does not support the claim that moral cognition, understood as a specific form of normative cognition, is a product of evolution. Instead, they suggest that the evidence only supports the more modest claim that a general capacity for normative cognition evolved. They argue that if this is the case then the prospects for evolutionary debunking arguments are bleak. A debunking argument (...) which relied on the fact that normative cognition in general evolved might threaten all areas of normative belief, including the epistemic norms upon which the argument relies. For the sake of argument, we accept their claim that specifically moral cognition did not evolve. However, we reject their contention that this critically undermines evolutionary debunking arguments of morality. A number of strategies are available to solve what we call the “containment problem,” or how to effectively debunk morality without thereby debunking normative cognition tout court. Furthermore, debunking arguments need not rely on the claim that normative cognition in general evolved. So long as at least some aspects of moral cognition have evolved, this may be sufficient to support an evolutionary debunking argument against many of our moral beliefs. Thus, even if Machery & Mallon are right that specifically moral cognition did not evolve, research in evolutionary psychology may have radical implications for moral philosophy. (shrink)

This paper is interested in the individual memory of wars in Maïssa Bey. The writer devoted her two books to the wars in Algeria - they were written to be adapted to the theatre: Entendez-vous dans les montagnes… and Pierre Sang Papier ou Cendre. In Entendez-vous dans les montagnes..., the memory in question is that of the War of Independence against the colonization during the years 1956-1962, while Pierre Sang Papier ou Cendre addresses the French colonization that lasted 132 years, (...) from 1830 to 1962. In other words, the first relies on individual and collective memories, while the second concerns especially the collective memory. (shrink)

One of the most challenging and rewarding roles for in-house hospital attorneys is serving as a member of their hospital’s Bioethics Committee. As a member of the Committee, an attorney assists in developing institutional ethics policies and guidelines, and also participates in ethics consultations involving disputes about patient care. Institutions such as the Author’s employer, Texas Children’s Hospital, promote open and honest communications between members of a patient’s health care team and the patient’s parents and family; however, when communications break (...) down, the Committee’s goal is to provide an objective forum where disputes can be discussed and hopefully resolved in a professional, ethical manner. (shrink)

One of the most challenging and rewarding roles for in-house hospital attorneys is serving as a member of their hospital’s Bioethics Committee. As a member of the Committee, an attorney assists in developing institutional ethics policies and guidelines, and also participates in ethics consultations involving disputes about patient care. Institutions such as the Author’s employer, Texas Children’s Hospital, promote open and honest communications between members of a patient’s health care team and the patient’s parents and family; however, when communications break (...) down, the Committee’s goal is to provide an objective forum where disputes can be discussed and hopefully resolved in a professional, ethical manner. (shrink)

One of the most challenging and rewarding roles for in-house hospital attorneys is serving as a member of their hospital’s Bioethics Committee. As a member of the Committee, an attorney assists in developing institutional ethics policies and guidelines, and also participates in ethics consultations involving disputes about patient care. Institutions such as the Author’s employer, Texas Children’s Hospital, promote open and honest communications between members of a patient’s health care team and the patient’s parents and family; however, when communications break (...) down, the Committee’s goal is to provide an objective forum where disputes can be discussed and hopefully resolved in a professional, ethical manner. (shrink)

Ethical sourcing and socially responsible purchasing is increasingly on the business agenda, but developing and implementing policy and practice across a global network of suppliers is challenging. The purpose of this paper is to expand theory on the nature of linkages between firms in a social network, specifically postulating how ties between organizations can be configured to facilitate development, diffusion, and adoption of sustainability initiatives. The theory development provides a lens with which to view the influence of a firm’s structural (...) embeddedness in its organizational social network on developing, diffusing and adopting sustainability initiatives. The focus is on brokers who in various structural alignments help bridge the focal firm’s sustainability initiatives with distant or disconnected stakeholders the focal firm is trying to reach. The brokers help the focal firm engage these stakeholders by sharing knowledge and information regarding sustainability initiatives and by incorporating localized needs into the development of the initiatives to facilitate better diffusion and adoption. The theoretical contribution of this manuscript is a novel perspective on sustainability in organizational networks. This perspective allows for greater explanatory power regarding how organizations can achieve sustainable outcomes that meet a broad base of stakeholder needs and better facilitate sustainability initiatives across a diverse and expansive network. (shrink)

In this paper, we present and defend a modest anti-realist conception of aesthetic properties – e.g. being unified, moving, delicate, tragic, etc – in order to motivate a contextualist semantic view about aesthetic judgments. We argue that aesthetic properties are plausibly seen as viewpoint-dependent even though our epistemic access to the presence of aesthetic properties is decidedly more complicated than other, less controversial instances of viewpoint-dependent properties. On the basis of our anti-realist conception, we argue, utilizing the Kaplanian distinction between (...) character and content within a possible worlds semantic theory, that the contents expressed in aesthetic thought and language are sensitive to certain contextual features of a particular thinker’s or speaker’s situation. Finally, we address a number of formidable objections to our view, objections concerning certain context-sensitivity diagnostics, and sho... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi MorisatoLance H. Gracy (bio)Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond. By Takeshi Morisato. England: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019. Pp. viii + 269. Hardcover $116.00, isbn 978-1-350-09251-8.Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy: Reading Tanabe Hajime and William Desmond by Takeshi Morisato is an informative and (...) insightful read on metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and relevant areas of interest. Morisato's stated objective in the introduction is (a) to investigate the possibility of comparative philosophy through William Desmond's metaxological way of thinking, and (b) to examine how the "absolute dialectic" in Tanabe Hajime's metanoesis can help us understand the relationship between one framework of thinking and another (p. 16). Morisato's book proceeds in five parts. Part One orients the reader to the scope of the project through an overview of comparative philosophy and its methodological frameworks--namely, the metaxological methodology of William Desmond, which deals importantly with the (modern) predicament of religion as expressed in the "transcendental univocity" of the Kantian system; and the metanoetic methodology of Tanabe Hajime, which deals importantly with the issue of "rational progress" in Hegelian dialectic. Yet each intellectual framework deals with both Kant's and Hegel's systems. Part Two addresses what the problem of religion in Kantian and Hegelian philosophy is in more detail. Part Three, "Metaxology and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," and Part Four, "Metanoetics and the Problems of the Philosophy of Religion," offer a more detailed account concerning how Desmond's and Tanabe's philosophies tackle conceptual problems in modern philosophy of religion. Morisato's conclusion follows from these along with an endnotes section, bibliography, and index.According to Morisato, overcoming the problem of comparative philosophy--i.e., the "philosophical problem of comparing two systems of thinking rooted in different cultural and intellectual contexts" (p. 22)--means, at least in part, clarifying the extent to which philosophers of different culturalintellectual contexts and backgrounds share, as "kindred spirits" or as "intellectual companions," a consonance of thought regarding their philosophical perspectives. Desmond and Tanabe represent just such a pair, whose consonance of thought, expressed by Morisato en passant and expressed more definitively in the conclusion, is unified in a struggle against hegemonic structures in the [End Page 1] philosophy of religion, specifically those of Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of religion. William Desmond (1951–present) is a Catholic philosopher who currently holds the David R. Cook Chair in Philosophy at Villanova University. He has worked extensively on metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and German idealism. Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) was a Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto school and is perhaps most well-known for his Philosophy as Metanoetics. Morisato does a commendable job elucidating issues in modern systems of religion, which have undoubtedly been influenced by Kant's and Hegel's systems. As it concerns Kant, contemporary philosophy of religion still struggles with the claims of transcendental idealism, particularly its reduction of religious belief to mere postulates of practical reason. And as it concerns Hegel, what seems to be an unending, "progressive" self-return of dialectical monism has deeply influenced the way, and manner, in which religious adherents deal with societal views of the individual and individuals' views of society. By this token, Morisato's attempt to get beyond the so-called "extirpation" of the source of religious truth as the "creative power behind our understanding of reality and our existence" is refreshing, to say the least (p. 46). In what follows, I offer a relatively brief overview of Morisato's book and conclude with a reflection on the text.Morisato's critique of the Kantian and Hegelian systems begins with the argument that Kantian transcendental univocity implies that reason's autonomy, as dictates of the moral law as absolute duties, not only precedes divine legislation, but becomes one with it or else is reduced to it. In other words, for Kant, the rational-moral universal is divine law. However, reason's autonomy fails to comprehend the divine origination of finite particulars due to... (shrink)

Why do marketing managers in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and China often engage in competitively irrational behavior, choosing pricing strategies that damage competitors’ profits, rather than choosing pricing strategies that improve their firm’s profits? We propose one possible reason, the moral vacuum created by the collapse of communist ideology. We hypothesize and find that managers who experienced formal communist moral ideological indoctrination are less likely to be competitively irrational than the post-communist managers who did not. Implications are discussed.

ABSTRACTWhat is the relationship between structure and agency? French philosopher Michel Foucault weighed in on this question, and I argue that some of his writings indicate that he held views that were strongly structuralist. If I am correct in my interpretation of Foucault in these works, was he right to think this? Is there evidence in his work that perhaps agents do have more influence than his concept of structuralism can account for? I suggest that this is the case and (...) will argue that Foucault's structuralist views are incomplete and result in an incoherence. I then offer a critical realist account of structure and agency which seems to be able to resolve the incoherence and thus offers a better explanation of the evidence that Foucault provides. (shrink)

This article considers the late 19th-century medical invention of the category of the homosexual in relation to homosexuality’s moment of deliverance from medicine in the 1970s, when it was removed as a category of mental aberration in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). With the rise of the AIDS pandemic in gay communities in the early 1980s, I argue that homosexuals were forcibly returned to the medical sphere, a process I call “the painful reunion.” Reading a collection of queer narratives (...) across the 20th century, I show that historical and contemporaneous medical events prompted the mobilization of seropositive and queer artists at century’s end to rehabilitate, revise, and offend the historiography of queer illness. Collectively, my conclusions redefine our understandings of queer theory and queer politics as distinctively 1990s projects invested in the present to ones that purposefully aim to challenge the past. (shrink)

This chapter of Ender's Game addresses two questions. First, are Ender's killings of Stilson and Bonzo morally permissible? He destroys them both and robs their families of them. Could this ever be morally permissible? Second, is Ender morally responsible for the consequences of his actions? Ender blames himself for the destruction of the buggers, but would he have done the same thing if he had known it was all for real? Perhaps by allowing the I.F. to train him for this (...) purpose, he had always intended to do it. Of course, Ender is not the only one involved here: maybe the International Fleet Command is responsible for the consequences of Ender's actions. After all, they unquestionably manipulate and structure Ender's surroundings, and clearly, it is the I.F. that intends for the buggers to die‐even if Ender does not. (shrink)

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

It is argued that there is a plausible way to read Kant as consistently repudiating a two-worlds picture and upholding a de-reistic view whereby the transcendental object or thing in itself indicates only a pure concept of the understanding whose role is to govern the synthesis of any unified manifold. This reading of Kant liberates him from the well-known textual and philosophical difficulties of the two-worlds view. Furthermore, I argue that this interpretation leads to a strong idealist position as opposed (...) to the double-aspect view of Allison and Prauss. This idealist position was basically adopted by Fichte in his Introductions to the Science of Knowledge of 1797, wherein the debunking of the thing in itself was a crucial step in his ultimate argument for the unity of theoretical and practical reason. (shrink)

A central aspect of people's beliefs about the mind is that mental activities—for example, thinking, reasoning, and problem solving—are interrelated, with some activities being kinds or parts of others. In common-sense psychology, reasoning is a kind of thinking and reasoning is part of problem solving. People's conceptions of these mental kinds and parts can furnish clues to the ordinary meaning of these terms and to the differences between folk and scientific psychology. In this article, we use a new technique for (...) deriving partial orders to analyze subjects' decisions about whether one mental activity is a kind or part of another. The resulting taxonomies and partonomies differ from those of common object categories in exhibiting a converse relation in this domain: One mental activity is a part of another if the second is a kind of the first. The derived taxonomies and partonomies also allow us to predict results from further experiments that examine subjects' memory for these activities, their ratings of the activities' importance, and their judgments about whether there could be "possible minds" that possess some of the activities but not others. (shrink)

After a decades-long economic slump, the city of Flint, Michigan, struggled to address chronic issues of toxic water supply, malnutrition, and food security gaps among its residents. A community-engaged research project proposed a resilience assessment that would use panarchy theory to move the city toward a more sustainable food system. Flint is one of many examples that demonstrates how panarchy theory is being applied to understand and influence change in complex human-natural systems. Applied Panarchy, the much-anticipated successor to Lance (...) Gunderson and C.S. Holling's seminal 2002 volume Panarchy, documents the extraordinary advances in interdisciplinary panarchy scholarship and applications over the past two decades. Panarchy theory has been applied to a broad range of fields, from economics to law to urban planning, changing the practice of environmental stewardship for the better in measurable, tangible ways.Panarchy describes the way systems--whether forests, electrical grids, agriculture, coastal surges, public health, or human economies and governance--are part of even larger systems that interact in unpredictable ways. Although humans desire resiliency and stability in our lives to help us understand the world and survive, nothing in nature is permanently stable. How can society anticipate and adjust to the changes we see around us? Where Panarchy proposed a framework to understand how these transformational cycles work and how we might influence them, Applied Panarchy takes the scholarship to the next level, demonstrating how these concepts have been modified and refined. The book shows how panarchy theory intersects with other disciplines, and how it directly influences natural resources management and environmental stewardship.Intended as a text for graduate courses in environmental sciences and related fields, Applied Panarchy picks up where Panarchy left off, inspiring new generations of scholars, researchers, and professionals to put its ideas to work in practical ways. (shrink)

This chapter looks at how Göransson's motifs emotionally move us, but also how the music “reads the mind” of Din. In conveying meaning musically, Göransson's compositions enhance our aesthetic appreciation of The Mandalorian and further our emotional investment in Din's story. The ancient Greeks included music in education because they believed it perfects our soul or nature. Aristotle mentions that another purpose of music is to provide us with pleasure from the relaxation it provides. As Din and Kuiil set out (...) on their mission riding the blurrgs, The Mandalorian theme plays in full glory – a symphonic march with trumpets carrying most of the melody and harmony along with electric and bass guitars which help drive the orchestra. In addition to the pleasure we feel from enjoying well‐ordered emotional movements of music, Aristotle mentions another kind of pleasure we can feel from music: intellectual enjoyment. (shrink)

This chapter lays out the paradox of fiction as it relates to the Star Wars films in three claims: we have genuine and rational emotional responses to the fictional characters and events in Star Wars; we must believe these characters and events really exist; and nobody believes these fictional characters and events in Star Wars exist. While many fans like to talk as if the characters and events in Star Wars are real, none of us actually believe that Luke's heroic (...) journey is real. The illusion theory claims that the fictional work creates in us the illusion that the characters and situations depicted actually exist. One observation that the thought theory makes is that we often have emotional reactions to imaginary situations. The pretend theory says that the emotions we experience while watching Star Wars are not genuine emotions. Rather, they're quasi‐emotions. (shrink)

In this paper we demonstrate the importance of non-economic values to community-based conservation by presenting findings from research into Kunlog Community Resource Management Area (CREMA) in northern Ghana. One of the central motivations for creating the CREMA was to reinforce a traditional taboo on bushbuck, and while some respondents mentioned the possibility of eventually attracting tourists, the primary desire behind the CREMA is to protect bushbuck and other wildlife for future generations. Several respondents emphasised wanting children and grandchildren to be (...) able to grow up seeing the wildlife. Material benefits should not be the sole focus of those involved in promoting and legislating frameworks for community-based conservation - frameworks such as Ghana's CREMA policy. Government frameworks for the creation, registration and regulation of conservation initiatives should be flexible and able to accommodate diverse community-based conservation initiatives driven from a variety of mixes of motivations, including motivations deriving from non-material values. (shrink)

Many experiments with infants suggest that they possess quantitative abilities, and many experimentalists believe that these abilities set the stage for later mathematics: natural numbers and arithmetic. However, the connection between these early and later skills is far from obvious. We evaluate two possible routes to mathematics and argue that neither is sufficient: (1) We first sketch what we think is the most likely model for infant abilities in this domain, and we examine proposals for extrapolating the natural number concept (...) from these beginnings. Proposals for arriving at natural number by (empirical) induction presuppose the mathematical concepts they seek to explain. Moreover, standard experimental tests for children's understanding of number terms do not necessarily tap these concepts. (2) True concepts of number do appear, however, when children are able to understand generalizations over all numbers; for example, the principle of additive commutativity (a+b=b+a). Theories of how children learn such principles usually rely on a process of mapping from physical object groupings. But both experimental results and theoretical considerations imply that direct mapping is insufficient for acquiring these principles. We suggest instead that children may arrive at natural numbers and arithmetic in a more top-down way, by constructing mathematical schemas. (shrink)

Bayes nets are formal representations of causal systems that many psychologists have claimed as plausible mental representations. One purported advantage of Bayes nets is that they may provide a theory of counterfactual conditionals, such as If Calvin had been at the party, Miriam would have left early. This article compares two proposed Bayes net theories as models of people's understanding of counterfactuals. Experiments 1-3 show that neither theory makes correct predictions about backtracking counterfactuals (in which the event of the if-clause (...) occurs after the event of the then-clause), and Experiment 4 shows the same is true of forward counterfactuals. An amended version of one of the approaches, however, can provide a more accurate account of these data. (shrink)

This article addresses the precarious place of transgender and gender non-cis persons in relation to their discrimination-protections in recent legal, medical, and ethical policies in the United States. At present, there exists a contradiction such that trans persons are considered "pathological" enough that they are included in the latest iteration of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V) as "gender dysphoric," but they are not included in the category of "disabled" under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). As (...) such, trans persons in America are subject to the stigma of pathology (albeit with medical treatment) without the full protections of the ADA. By contrast, transgender and non-cis-gender Americans find their queer cohorts who are HIV-positive to be fully protected by the ADA. We ask whether transgender and non-cis-gender persons should embrace their (already pathologized) personhood as a disability. Sometimes "choosing disability" affords more rights than it deploys stigma. (shrink)

The discipline of Mental Health Counseling, referred to in this essay as Counseling, has no substantial philosophy. In the United States, much of Counseling philosophy is rooted in the American Counseling Association’s code of ethics. However, this is a code of material conduct, not a substantial Counseling philosophy, and by this orientation the distinction between doing and the knowledge that informs activity is not understood important. Counseling theories thereby adhere in a third principle that is left to disseminate in foreign (...) powers. This is to say, Counseling is commonly understood as a name for a loose set of theoretical practices bound by ethical standards, that these practices are reckoned to lay apart from one another while all referencing or otherwise answering to psychology. Due to this deferment, the apparent rise of mental health issues could be attributed to a weakening of intentional focus, since psychology, by its own scientific standard, is less a standard of care than an experimental method oriented in discovering and implementing an objective reality through which it then offers corrective protocols. This essay draws upon philosophical efforts more rigorous than a granting of epistemological deferment to propose that Counseling is a practice unto itself, in-itself, of a true substance, concerned, involved with, and related to psychology but not subject to it. (shrink)

In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.Every physician-patient encounter is a conflict of interest. Every physician-payer encounter is also a conflict of interest.Wide-spread criticism of the pharmaceutical industry’s extravagant marketing practices and some doctors’ undignified, even appalling eagerness to stuff themselves, their pockets and their offices with the industry’s “stuff,” prompted physician groups, the drug and device industry itself to institute reforms designed better to limit industry influence on physicians.But according to Troyen Brennan and his (...) coauthors, the reforms, while reducing some of the most egregious instances of industry influence peddling and physicians’ self-debasement, were doomed fundamentally, for three reasons. First, they were based on common sense but incorrect assumptions about the mechanism of industry influence and on myths about the efficacy of disclosure as an ethical disinfectant. Second, they relied on voluntary adherence and so failed to pinpoint responsibility for monitoring compliance and enforcement. (shrink)

This article reports results from two studies of how people answer counterfactual questions about simple machines. Participants learned about devices that have a specific configuration of components, and they answered questions of the form “If component X had not operated [failed], would component Y have operated?” The data from these studies indicate that participants were sensitive to the way in which the antecedent state is described—whether component X “had not operated” or “had failed.” Answers also depended on whether the device (...) is deterministic or probabilistic—whether X's causal parents “always” or only “usually” cause X to operate. Participants' explanations of their answers often invoked non-operation of causally prior components or unreliability of prior connections. They less often mentioned independence from these causal elements. (shrink)

In the name of restoring professionalism, an influential group of physician-educators have urged academic medical centers to take the lead in purging the house of medicine of the conflicts of interest created by industry's marketing. I argue that this revivalist movement is misguided, uses “conflict of interest” as an epithet, creates counter-productive incentives, and fails the duty to prepare physicians for ethical engagement with their commercial partners in patient care.

In the last section of “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth Anscombe puts on display three possible problematic relations to what may be thought of as three different kinds of necessity. The first relation is to pretend not to recognize the necessity that binds description to description in a paradigm case. The second relation is to fail to respond to a more primitive kind of necessity, thereby showing what Anscombe infamously calls “a corrupt mind.” The third relation is sometimes consciously to act, (...) because of a non-virtuous character, against a third kind of necessity, discovered by Aristotle, namely, the necessity of that on whichgood hangs. While the last section of “Modern Moral Philosophy” does not discuss in detail these relations or kinds of necessity, it foreshadows Anscombe’s latertreatment of them. (shrink)

This study extends the examination of moral content in the media by exploring moral messages in television programming and viewer characteristics predictive of the ability to perceive such messages. Generalisability analyses confirmed the reliability of the Media’s Moral Messages (MMM) rating form for analysing programme content and the existence of 10 moral themes prevalent in television media. Standard regression analyses yielded evidence indicating viewers’ moral expertise, as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT), familiarity with the programme and level of (...) education predicted their ability to perceive moral messages in a television drama popular in the USA at the time of data collection. Identification of patterns in moral content represented in television programming, as well as knowledge of how viewer characteristics relate to their ability to perceive such content, can provide parents and educators with a means for better comprehending messages regarding human interaction to which they or their children are exposed. (shrink)

“Strict gun control” has no clear meaning,so it is necessary to clarify it.I define SGC as an array of legally sanctioned restrictions designed to impose firearm scarcity on the general population. SGC’s public policy goal, gun scarcity, commonly rests on the predicates that “dangerous criminal control” is not the central problem for reducing the problem of criminal gun violence but rather that it is the social prevalence of the distinctively-lethal instruments by which both supposedly “good citizens” as well as violent (...) criminals inflict a staggeringly high percentage of injury and death.Professor Zimring is one SGC’s most distinguished, prolific and comprehensive theorists. He has advocated for handgun scarcity among the general population since at least 1969. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why Gun Control Matters The Initial Entitlement Problem The Regulatory Power Dangerous‐possessor Gun Control Strict Gun Control Guns as Environmental Toxins Gun Prevalence as a Social Cause of the US Homicide Rate How Many Guns? America's Homicide Rate Guns and Social Causation of the Homicide Rate Mechanism in Causal Accounts Mental Causation The Paradox of Gun Control and Reasonable Policies Conclusion Acknowledgments.

A recent New York Times/CBS poll shows that nearly 80 percent of respondents think the American “health care system is headed toward a crisis because of rising costs.” Indeed, the public has become well acquainted with ominous-looking graphs that detail the nation’s health care spending. The increasingly steep slope of the graph showing the percentage of gross domestic product spent on health care invites tongue-in-cheek projections for when health care spending will finally consume it all.High aggregate health care expenditures result (...) from the low prices individuals pay for coverage. On average, patients pay only five cents out-of-pocket for every dollar of hospital charges they generate. The remainder is paid by private or public health insurance. Patients pay slightly more for physicians’ services—nineteen cents on each dollar. For health care of all types, patients pay approximately twenty-four cents on each dollar. With individuals paying what amount to fire sale prices for health care, it should come as no surprise that they purchase a great deal of coverage. (shrink)

… no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient, for the true physician … is not a mere money-maker.A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical care.[We] are agents. Our constitution is put in our power. We are charged with it; (...) and therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it.Conscience is a sense of duty that inhibits and prompts conduct by threatening distress for noncompliance. Liberty—to live according to the dictates of one's conscience and not to be compelled to live in... (shrink)

“Strict gun control” has no clear meaning,so it is necessary to clarify it.I define SGC as an array of legally sanctioned restrictions designed to impose firearm scarcity on the general population. SGC’s public policy goal, gun scarcity, commonly rests on the predicates that “dangerous criminal control” is not the central problem for reducing the problem of criminal gun violence but rather that it is the social prevalence of the distinctively-lethal instruments by which both supposedly “good citizens” as well as violent (...) criminals inflict a staggeringly high percentage of injury and death.Professor Zimring is one SGC’s most distinguished, prolific and comprehensive theorists. He has advocated for handgun scarcity among the general population since at least 1969. (shrink)

Pragmatism has enjoyed a major resurgence in Anglo-American philosophy over the course of the last decade or two, and Robert Brandom’s work – particularly his 1994 tome Making it Explicit (MIE) – has been at the vanguard of this resurgence (Brandom 1994).2 But pragmatism comes in several surprisingly distinct flavours. Authors such as Hubert Dreyfus find their roots in certain parts of Heidegger and in phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, and they privilege embodied, preconceptual skills as opposed to discursive practices as (...) the basic sites of meaning and agency (Dreyfus 1991; Dreyfus 1992; Todes 2001). With strong inheritances from Dewey and Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty has championed a pragmatism whose core emphasis is on the rejection of transcendental truth and high metaphysical theorizing (Rorty 1982), and this anti-theoretical banner has been taken up by several prominent ethicists, among others. For his part, Brandom, who purports to offer a systematic theory of language and meaning grounded on a foundation of pragmatic normative relationships between speakers, looks back instead to Sellars and Quine for his stripe of pragmatism. Near the start of MIE, he writes: The explanatory strategy pursued here is to begin with an account of social practices, identify the particular structure they must exhibit in order to qualify as specifically linguistic practices, and then consider what different sorts of semantic contents those practices can confer on states, performances, and expressions caught up in them in suitable ways. (Brandom 1994, xiii) Despite his professed pragmatism, Brandom is no foe of high theory or metanarratives, and he is vastly more interested in language and theoretical reason than in the rest of human bodily activity. For Brandom, inferentially articulated discourse forms an autonomous domain of normativity, while our bodily encounters with the world in perception and in action serve as language entry and exit points respectively.. (shrink)

This dissertation is concerned with normativity both as an explanatory device in the philosophy of language, logic and epistemology and as a philosophical issue in its own right. Following later Wittgenstein and Sellars, it is argued that language is normative, in the first instance because of the fact that speech acts take place within a structure of social norms and institutions. This fact is then utilized to show that important features of semantic content can be explained in terms of such (...) norms. ;This Sellarsian conception of linguistic usage as the performance of acts within a linguistic game of giving and asking for reasons, leads us to focus on inferential proprieties as central to semantic content. It is, then, natural to look at logical vocabulary, paradigmatically 'entails', as expressing the very normative relations definitive of this content. An idea of Brandom's is developed in providing a formal theory of the inferential content of logical vocabulary. Such normative-inferentialist semantic analyses are developed for a wide range of logical systems. ;A certain conception of justification also falls naturally out of this general theory of language. If asserting is an act performed within a linguistic game, then justification can be thought of as a matter of winning such a game, a successfully defending one's assertion in the face of licensed challenges to it. This account is developed, drawing consequences for the theory of rationality and knowledge. ;The second major issue of the dissertation is the theory of the normative itself and much of the constructive work in the philosophy of language, philosophy of logic and epistemology forms a case study for a particular theory of the normative. On the basis of Wittgensteinian considerations, it is argued that normativity must be understood as resting ultimately on social practice. ;We solve problems of earlier accounts of norms by introducing a novel normative relation between assertions of normative propriety and social practices. Normative assertions do not describe existing social standards, but do nonetheless derive their semantic content from those standards. This argument carried through in detail for cases of logical and epistemic vocabulary in the dissertation. (shrink)

We often treat our basic, unmotivated desires as reason-giving: you’re thirsty and take yourself to have a reason to walk to the drinking fountain; you care intrinsically about your young daughter and take yourself to have a reason to feed and clothe her. We think these desires generate normative practical reasons. But are there basic desires that don’t? It might seem so, for we sometimes find ourselves impelled to do some very strange, and some very awful, things. For example, would (...) a loving mother with a violent impulse thereby come to have a reason to harm her beloved child? Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that there are basic desires, such as the mother’s, that fail to generate reasons. Can a subjectivist, a theorist in the Humean tradition, accept this thesis? Against the historical grain, I argue yes. I frame my discussion in terms of solving a puzzle in Harry Frankfurt’s subjectivist theory of rational agency and appeal to the concept of a personal ideal to reveal how a subjectivist, a follower of Hume, can countenance the existence of “rationally impotent basic desires.”. (shrink)